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ABSTRACT 
In order to support emerging network businesses, such as Voice-over-IP (VoIP), virtual learning, video conferencing, and 
telemedicine, the Internet has to provide classes of service that are better than traditional ‘best-effort’ service. In computer 
networks, Quality of Service (QoS) is defined as the mechanisms that allow differentiation of network services based on their 
unique service requirements. To provide QoS over the current Internet, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and 
others have proposed a number of architectures, including Integrated Service (IntServ) and Differentiated Service (DiffServ). 
This research examines the basic issue of designing pricing models for Internet services at various quality levels. By 
formulating a pricing formula that is based on price-quality schema drawn from marketing theory, this research provides a 
unique approach to understand the pricing of Internet services. The pricing model in this research provides a flexible and 
dynamic capability to develop Internet pricing for upcoming digital economy. 
Keywords 
Quality of Service (QoS), Communication Network, Network Service Pricing, Dynamic Pricing 
INTRODUCTION 
When the digital economy is defined as the economy that is based on the creation and exchange of digitized information 
(Zimmermann 2000), communication networks, especially the Internet, have important roles in this new economic model. 
Network service providers should develop new services to improve the exchange of information and create value through 
existing infrastructures. By providing different levels of service (QoS), network service providers can develop new sources of 
profit for themselves, and the companies who are using these new structures can develop new digital products and services 
that were not possible with the previous best-effort networks. 
We observed that the technical solutions are there, but the network service providers (NSP) are reluctant to provide these new 
services, partially because of the lack of proper pricing mechanisms. By proper pricing mechanism we mean that the pricing 
strategies should be logical and persuasive for customers, economical to compensate the service costs of the network services, 
and profitable to allow competition in the market and bring competitive advantages to the companies. 
Pricing a product or a service is a difficult but important task for an organization. With the right pricing, a company can 
acquire customers, retain them, and make profits. Therefore, a pricing strategy provides a “bottom line” for the business and 
maintains customer “goodwill” (Lewis and Shoemaker 1997). Pricing has been considered to be “difficult to imitate and a 
source of sustainable competitive advantage” (Dutta, Bergen, Levy, Ritson, and Zbaracki 2002). 
Traditional pricing of Internet service is has focused on recovering costs or maximizing profits (MacKie-Mason and Varian 
1995). The pricing theories that are based on economics assume rational behavior and utility maximization of the participants 
in the ‘ perfect’ market (Monroe 2003). The price is supposed to be changed according to the demand and supply functions 
of the market (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2001; Monroe 2003). However, after the privatization of communication networks and 
remarkable technical developments, network service providers have suffered from the lack of adequate and practical pricing 
model for their services (Odlyzko 2001). 
Compared to the previous decade’s communication network that is data centric, the current Internet users often transmit voice 
and video along with data. Voice and video communications are more stringent in their quality requirements than data. They 
are more sensitive to delays and require reliable transmission of the packets. Because the characteristics of traffic have 
changed, we need some reconsideration of the implications of architecture, service classes, and design principles on the 
pricing models of Internet service providers (Blumenthal and Clark 2001). 
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QUALITY OF SERVICE NETWORK 
In earlier days, Quality of Service (QoS) meant delivering packets from the source to the destination without any 
transmission errors. As the Internet has become commercialized, however, QoS has started to become an important strategic 
tool for market competition (Ferguson and Huston 1998). 
Current Internet provides ‘best-effort’ service for packet transmissions. Although, the last mile connection speed from 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) to customer could be different, the core network provides same quality of service for all 
packets regardless of the characteristics of the packets. 
To support QoS network, two improvements to the level of service have been proposed. Integrated Services (IntServ) uses a 
resource reservation mechanism and provides connection-oriented services as do traditional telephone networks (Ferrari and 
Verma 1990; Braden, Clark and Shenker 1994). 
Differentiated Service (DiffServ) marks each incoming packet based on the service requirement of the packet (Bernet, Binder, 
Blake, Carlson, Davies, Ohlman, Verma, Wang, and Weiss 1998). Intermediate routers interpret the marking information and 
provide a predefined service that is known as Per-Hop-Behavior (PHB) (Striegel and Manimaran 2002). Table 1 shows the 
differences between different QoS architectures that are compared with the traditional best effort service network. 
 
Approach QoS Specification Strength Weakness 
Best Effort TCP/IP 
Overprovision of the network resource 
Error checking and retransmission 
Simple 
De facto Standard 
Service quality is not 
guaranteed 
Network resources are 
overused. 
IntServ/ RSVP1 Reserve network resources per call 
Connection oriented and refresh regularly 
Guaranteed performance 
Stable communication 
Lack of scalability 
Complex management 
DiffServ/ BB2 DiffServ Code Point (DSCP) 
Per-Hop-Behavior (PHB) 
Connectionless management 
Scalable and flexible Lack of performance guarantee 
Table 1. Summary of the Quality of Service Architecture 
 
INTERNET SERVICE PRICING FOR QOS NETWORK 
Current Internet pricing has two forms, flat rate pricing and usage-based pricing. Flat rate pricing is simple to understand and 
easy to implement (Wiseman 2000). All customers are charged equally by some criterion such as connection speed, 
connection time, or connected location. There is empirical evidence that consumers prefer a simple flat price, even if they 
have to pay a higher price (Altmann and Chu 2001; Odlyzko 2001). This phenomenon explains the importance of the 
certainty or price predictability. In addition, network service providers can save costs for accounting and management with 
flat rate pricing mechanism. Since simple pricing promotes the overall network usage, network service providers can make 
more profit (Wiseman 2000). 
However, flat rate pricing does not reflect the current congestion level, and cannot solve the network congestion problem. All 
packets are treated equally in this mechanism and there is no chance to select a different service class. The classic problem of 
the “tragedy of the commons” cannot be prevented in the flat rate pricing mechanism (Odlyzko 2001). 
With a usage based pricing scheme, customers would pay for what they actually use. Although usage based pricing is 
beneficial to customers and network service providers, they do not welcome this pricing scheme (DaSilva 2000). Customers 
want to have simple and predictable pricing plans rather than complex and possibly more expensive ones. A reasonable and 
understandable approach to pricing based on quality and service demand is needed. 
                                                          
1 RSVP: Resource reSerVation Protocol 
2 BB: Bandwidth Broker 
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Adapting consumer perception theory from marketing literature (Lewis and Shoemaker 1997; Monroe 2003), this research 
proposes a reasonable and scalable pricing model for Quality of Service (QoS) network service providers. To maximize the 
profit, network service providers should design pricing strategy to reflect the willingness to pay of their customers. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
Although QoS mechanisms are available in technical documentations, there are few practical QoS network. It is partially 
because of the lack of proper pricing (Crowcroft, Hand, Mortier, Roscoe, and Warfield 2003). QoS pricing is difficult to 
develop since QoS network is dynamic and the service performance of QoS network is unpredictable in advance. This 
research has the questions that how to design effective QoS pricing mechanism. While other researches on Internet pricing 
focused on one side of pricing, this research tried to include both sides of network congestion control and profit maximization. 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION: QOS PRICING WITH PRICE-QUALITY SCHEMA 
In marketing, price has been determined to be an important cue for perceived product quality (Monroe 1990; Lewis and 
Shoemaker 1997; Rao, Qu and Ruekert, 1999; Brouthers, Werner and Matulich, 2000; Kirmani and Rao 2000; Varki and 
Colgate 2001). Consumers assume a positive relationship between quality and cost, although the quality and cost relationship 
was not always true for certain products in past years. For example, luxury automobiles such as Rolls Royce and Bentley are 
sold at a higher price but the actual quality may not justify this price. 
When the market price is high it changes the consumers’ perceptions about the quality of the product (Monroe 2003). A 
different pricing strategy provides an “imaginary effect” on perceptions of quality and leads to a willingness to buy (Naipaul 
and Parsa 2001). Most network pricing researchers assume that when the price is high the arrival rate or demand for that 
service class is low (Keon and Anandalingam 2003). However, this assumption may not be always true. Some customers 
value high quality services more than lower-class services. Therefore, some people buy more expensive services because they 
believe that they can get better quality of service by paying more. 
In many cases, price signals the quality of product and services that the user can expect to receive. When there is a strong 
relationship between price and quality perception, some people would buy more products and services even the price is 
relatively high. Therefore, network service providers can increase profit by charging higher prices for premium services. 
However, they can’t improve the service quality infinitely because the network bandwidth or the network resources are 
limited. Therefore, the pricing question should address how to maximize the profit within the limited capacity of the service 
network. 
RESEARCH MODEL 
We assume that when the quality of network services is known, we can determine prices for those services based on observed 
network parameters, actual service quality delivered, and market perceptions of the price. In other words, when we know the 
service quality, we can set the price through a certain formula of market indices and quality indicators. Figure 1 shows the 
simulated network model for this research. 
LAN
Application Server
Application Server
Router Router
Bottleneck Link
Service Provider Network
 
Figure 1. Simulated Network Service Model 
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Assumptions 
We assume there is a single network that has only one path from the source to the destination. The reason for this assumption 
is partially because this research is not related to the network routing problem but network service pricing. Therefore, the 
number of links or the complexity of the network architectures is not directly related to the research domain. 
We assume that there are m independent traffic flows in n network service classes. The jth traffic flow in the ith service class 
has unique service requirements that can be represented by average bandwidth requirement dij bits per second. 
Let ki represent the number of flows in ith service class, then demand of ith service class ui can be defined as follows: 
ui = , where i = 1, …, n and j = 1, …, m  (1) ∑
=
ki
j
j
id
1
∑
=
n
i
ik
1
= m   (2) 
Proposition 1 
The service quality of jth flow in ith class, Qij, is defined as the ratio of the served or fulfilled bandwidth, dij*, to requested 
bandwidth, dij, of the flow. 
Qij = d
d
j
i
j
i
*
, where i = 1, …, n and j = 1, …, m  (3) 
0 ≤   Qij  ≤ 1  (4) 
When the network is over-provisioned, we can set the service quality to 1, which means 100% service quality. The rationale 
for this definition is that once the service quality is 100%, more capacity does not lead to any performance improvement for 
the traffic. The actual bandwidth, dij*, is obtained in real time. In our case, we use simulation to obtain values for dij*. 
Qij = 1, when dij* ≥  dij  (5) 
Proposition 2 
The summation of the fulfilled bandwidth makes the total bandwidth consumption of ith service class, ui*. The unit of ui* is 
bits per second (bps). 
ui* = , where I = 1, …, n and j = 1, …, m  (6) ∑
=
ki
j
j
id
1
*
Also it should be noted that the ui* must be less than the bottleneck capacity Cbottleneck since the network can’t transmit more 
than its bottleneck link capacity at any time. 
∑
=
≤
n
i
linkbottlenecki Cu
1
*                     (7) 
Proposition 3 
The quality index Iqi of the ith service class is defined as the average of service quality Qij. 
Iqi  = 
k
Q
i
j
j
i
k i∑
=1    (8) 
0 ≤   Iqi  ≤ 1   (9) 
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For example, when we have 3 service classes, there are Iq1, Iq2, and Iq3 respectively. Iqi represents the average QoS level of the 
ith service class. 
Proposition 4 
We propose that the price of ith service class is based on the service quality of the class. In the equation, Pi is the price for bits 
per second of the ith service class. 
Pi = α + βi * Iqi   (10) 
α is the base price for a bit transmission (or any unit for quality) when there is no service guarantee (Iqi = 0; i.e. best effort 
service). It provides the lower bound price of the unreliable service. βi is the quality premium for service class i when the 
service has quality difference (Iqi > 0). Therefore, α + βi is the upper bound price for perfect service of Iqi = 1. 
The total revenue Ri of ith service class is defined as the product of the price and the total number of transmitted bits in ith 
service class. 
Ri = Pi * ui*   (11) 
R =    (12) ∑
=
n
i
iR
1
RESEARCH MODEL 
The proposed goal of a network service provider is to maximize the revenue function R in equation (12) with different level 
of prices and quality indices. The network service providers can develop different sets of α and β according to the QoS level 
of their networks. 
    Maximize R = ∑    (13) 
=
n
i
iR
1
      = ∑ * u
=
n
i
iP
1
i* 
      = ∑  
=
+
n
i
i
i
qi uI
1
**)*( βα
    Subject to 
       ∑
=
≤
n
i
linkbottlenecki Cu
1
*
      0 ≤ Iqi ≤ 1 for ∀ i 
      Pi  ≥ Pi-1  for i > 1 
      I iq  ≥ I   for i > 1 
1−i
q
The last two constraints explain one might charge premium price for high quality service. A network service provider may 
find the solution for this maximization function with various constraints such as network resource limitations, customer price 
sensitivity, and different network performance level. Although the entire model is an optimization problem, we are not 
solving this problem by using integer programming. Instead we will consider the various combinations of α and β according 
to the different service quality. 
About α 
We define α as the base or floor price of a network service. When service quality level equals to zero (Iqi = 0) or can’t be 
guaranteed, the price for that service equals α, which is greater than zero. Since the current Internet can’t guarantee a 
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specified level of service quality, α should be equivalent to the price of best-effort (BE) service in the current Internet 
architecture. 
To profitably provide communication services, the total revenue should be greater than the total cost of services. Therefore, α 
should be greater than the production cost of the service. The following equation shows the unit production cost of the 
service and α should be greater than the unit production cost. 
          Total Cost 
    α  ≥     ----------------------------  (14) 
      Network Capacity 
Since the network capacity is bounded by the bottleneck link of the entire path from the source to the destination, α should be 
equivalent to the following equation. 
               Total Cost 
  α   ≥     -------------------------------------- (15) 
      Bottleneck Link Capacity 
α is the minimum price of service class i when Iqi = 0. In a short run, α couldn’t be changed flexibly since the network 
capacity can’t be changed so fast to fulfill the demand fluctuations. Therefore, α should be fixed and used for production cost 
recovery and providing reasonable service margin. 
About β 
βi denotes the quality premium of service class i that have Iqi service performance. βi can be fixed for all service classes. 
βi = K (i = 1 ~ n) where K is constant.  (16) 
In this case, the different service class will be charged uniformly according to its service quality level. 
 
βi
Iqi
K
1  
βi
Iqi 1  
βi
Iqi 1  
Figure 2. Various βi by service quality 
Sometimes, we need to differentiate βi in accordance with corporate strategies. When a service provider wants to encourage 
or discourage the usage level of certain service classes, βi can be adjusted. There are two cases to consider. The first case is 
when we need to reserve the high quality service and make the performance better in that class, we can charge a significantly 
higher price for the service. In this case the high quality service users are charged exponentially, since the equation of (10) 
shows the price is the sum of α and the product of β and Iqi. When the β is increasing according to Iqi, the price P is increased 
as a product of the two. 
The other extreme case that decreasing βi with increasing Iqi could not happen in real situation because soon customers will 
prefer the higher Iqi with lower βi. 
βi can be determined by setting total revenue in advance. In this case, the service provider defines its profit goal with cost and 
appropriate profit margin. 
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 When R = Rfixed    = * u∑
=
n
i
iP
1
i*   (17) 
   = ∑  
=
+
n
i
i
i
qi uI
1
**)*( βα
In the above equation, α is equal to the total cost / ui*. Iqi and ui* are obtainable with network simulation, and therefore we 
can specify the βi. Rfixed is a constant pre-defined profit goal by the network service provider. 
About Price (P) 
We conducted simulation experiments to obtain specific results. Table 2 shows example pricing strategies for a network 
service provider. The service provider can specify α and β as fixed or variable. α could be fixed when the network service 
provider wants to recover its cost of service. However, when there is market competition the network service provider may 
differentiate α to compete in the market. It means the network service provider might provide its service with the price below 
the production costs, i.e., at a loss. In the long run a company can’t survive without cost recovery. 
When β is fixed, a user can select a QoS class according to his preferences and budget constraints. Each service class has a 
different price that is proportional to the service quality. Each service class has the same marginal cost of service quality. 
The network service provider can make β vary to promote specific service classes. If the β is increasing with Iqi, the unit price 
of high quality class services is more expensive than the unit price of lower class. If the β is decreasing with higher Iqi, the 
network service provider promotes the usage of higher QoS class service. 
 
  α  
  fixed variable  
fixed α + β * Iqi αi + β * Iqi User can select the class β 
variable α + βi * Iqi αi + βi * Iqi Promote certain service 
  Recover cost Market competition  
Table 2. Pricing Strategies Examples 
 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
We used the OPNET program as the simulation tool. OPNET software is a network simulation program, which is used by 
various service providers and network research institutions (OPNET 2002). 
There are six common applications such as e-mail, database, file transfer (FTP), web browsing, voice-over-IP, and video 
conferencing that originate from workstations in a local area network (LAN). Each application has specific requirements such 
as bandwidth, delay, jitter, and data loss. These configurations are similar to the statistical characteristics of real world 
applications (OPNET 2002). All applications share limited network links and are competing for network resources such as 
bandwidth, processors, and buffer. Therefore, a link between network routers is congested as a bottleneck always. 
The LAN is connected to a switch that is connected to an ingress router of the network service provider. There are two core 
routers in the service network and an egress router that are connected to the servers. The Ethernet server serves four 
applications that are not so sensitive to the delay and jitter. The video station and voice station provide the client level video 
conferencing application and voice over IP service respectively. 
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Figure 3. Network Model Configuration with OPNET 
 
For the simulation experiment, we set up two different network models; one for best effort (BE) and the other one for a 
DiffServ-based QoS network. The model doesn’t include the IntServ QoS model since the IntServ architecture has scalability 
problems in practice and this study is intended to be applicable to any network architecture that provides different level of 
QoS. 
Theoretically, BE networks do not need any QoS mechanisms that could support different users. In reality, however, the 
actual network router has limited buffer size that can hold only limited numbers of packet at any moment. FIFO (First In First 
Out) rule is applied to BE network and the last packet in the queue that exceeds the limited buffer size will be dropped. 
Compared to BE networks, the DiffServ network could have various QoS mechanisms such as queuing, packet classification, 
and packet dropping rule per each hop. Queuing mechanism provides the transmission rules of packet. Each packet is queued 
according to specifically predefined rules such as arrival order (FIFO), priority (PQ: Priority Queue), packet class (CQ: Class 
Queue), and others (WFQ: Weight Fair Queue). 
As another QoS tool, we used Committed Access Rate (CAR). CAR limits the incoming and outgoing traffic by using 
various criteria such as the interface, QoS group, and IP precedence information. When the traffic is in the predefined agreed 
or committed rate range, CAR transmits the conformed traffics into the network. If the traffic exceeds the rate range, CAR 
will drop or change the priority of the traffic and send it as low priority traffics. 
We applied Random Early Detection (RED) as a mechanism to prevent TCP synchronization failure by dropping packets 
randomly in advance (Floyd and Jacobson 1993). Once certain threshold is reached, the router starts to randomly drop some 
of the packets in its queue. The TCP applications in the end nodes notice this dropping and reduce their transmission rate. 
We developed 17 scenarios with different QoS settings (Table 3). Each scenario has unique QoS mechanisms such as 
queuing, random early detection, and committed access rate. 
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No Scenario Name Queuing CAR WRED Category 
1 Baseline - - - No QoS 
2 FQ_NC_NW FIFO No CAR No WRED 
3 PQ_NC_NW Priority Queue No CAR No WRED 
4 CQ_NC_NW Custom Queue No CAR No WRED 
5 WQ_NC_NW Weighted Queue No CAR No WRED 
Queuing 
6 FQ_C_NW FIFO CAR No WRED 
7 PQ_C_NW Priority Queue CAR No WRED 
8 CQ_C_NW Custom Queue CAR No WRED 
9 WQ_C_NW Weighted Queue CAR No WRED 
Queuing & 
CAR 
10 FQ_NC_W FIFO No CAR WRED 
11 PQ_NC_W Priority Queue No CAR WRED 
12 CQ_NC_W Custom Queue No CAR WRED 
13 WQ_NC_W Weighted Queue No CAR WRED 
Queuing & 
WRED 
14 FQ_C_W FIFO CAR WRED 
15 PQ_C_W Priority Queue CAR WRED 
16 CQ_C_W Custom Queue CAR WRED 
17 WQ_C_W Weighted Queue CAR WRED 
Queuing 
CAR 
WRED 
Table 3. Network Simulation Scenarios 
Table 4 shows a sample performance metrics of e-mail application for each scenario. To calculate the adequate pricing 
strategy the results of Table 5 are compared with the results of Table 4. 
Traffic (bytes/sec) 
Application Scenario 
Sent Received 
Response Time 
(sec) 
Baseline (dij) 6.10 6.10 2.234838439 
FQ_NC_NW 8.32 4.72 0.208857893 
PQ_NC_NW 89.43 106.81 9.420833711 
CQ_NC_NW 85.93 90.01 9.034450505 
WQ_NC_NW 102.44 89.54 29.242994717 
FQ_C_NW 127.53 120.46 10.978689566 
PQ_C_NW 106.69 99.83 9.290626928 
CQ_C_NW 114.38 126.33 11.825723516 
WQ_C_NW 105.74 86.29 29.806137322 
FQ_NC_W 41.65 14.66 7.922248958 
PQ_NC_W 100.97 107.21 7.875902969 
CQ_NC_W 29.95 23.42 1.796027971 
WQ_NC_W 11.66 5.29 - 
FQ_C_W 20.86 20.90 3.156187046 
PQ_C_W 19.19 16.23 3.798155261 
CQ_C_W 22.53 24.17 1.333995885 
E-Mail 
WQ_C_W 8.37 5.55 - 
Table 4. E-Mail Application Performance 
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Table 5 shows the performance percentage of e-mail application. The performance of e-mail application is averaged of sent 
and received traffic. 
 
Qij 3Adjusted QijScenario 
Sent Received Sent Received 
Average Qij
BaseLine 36.67% 45.62% 36.67% 45.62% 41.15% 
FQ_NC_NW 50.00% 35.28% 50.00% 35.28% 42.64% 
PQ_NC_NW 537.35% 798.44% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
CQ_NC_NW 516.35% 672.83% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
WQ_NC_NW 615.56% 669.33% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
FQ_C_NW 766.30% 900.49% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
PQ_C_NW 641.09% 746.30% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
CQ_C_NW 687.30% 944.33% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
WQ_C_NW 635.34% 645.05% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
FQ_NC_W 250.26% 109.56% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
PQ_NC_W 606.70% 801.41% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
CQ_NC_W 179.96% 175.07% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
WQ_NC_W 70.04% 39.52% 70.04% 39.52% 54.78% 
FQ_C_W 125.32% 156.25% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
PQ_C_W 115.30% 121.30% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
CQ_C_W 135.39% 180.64% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
WQ_C_W 50.26% 41.51% 50.26% 41.51% 45.89% 
Table 5. Application Performance (Qij) for E-Mail 
 
After we calculate performance for each application by scenario, we created the following table 6 for the QoS class service 
performance for each scenario. 
 
Scenario Class Application Average Qij Iqi ui* 
E-Mail 42.64% 6.52 
BE 
FTP 43.33% 
42.99% 
4.87 
DB 31.40% 18.04 
AF 
Web Browsing 6.20% 
18.80% 
10.04 
VoIP 0.00% 920.18 
FQ_NC_NW 
EF 
Video Conferencing 100.00% 
50.00% 
401978.61 
Table 6. FQ_NC_NW Scenario Simulation Results 
 
Finally, Table 7 shows the pricing comparisons between traditional best effort network and QoS network. Both pricing 
scheme is usage based. However, in QoS pricing mechanism, network service provider could have more revenue. 
 
                                                          
3 Adjusted Qij is calculated by the equation (5). 
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Traditional usage based pricing 
(FQ_NC_NW) 
QoS pricing 
(α = $ 0.1/bps and β = $ 0.05) 
Class Usage (bps) Price Revenue Revenue Price Usage (bps) Class 
$1.38 $0.12 11.39 BE 
$3.07 $0.11 28.08 AF 
BE 402938.26 $0.12 $48,352.59 
$50,362.35 $0.13 402898.79 EF 
[Table 7] BE pricing and QoS pricing (FQ_NC_NW) 
In the previous comparison tables we changed the QoS pricing based on the service quality differences of the class. The 
important point of this simulation study is that the service provider has a valid set of pricing rules that enable its pricing 
changes according to the service quality difference. Another strength of this pricing mechanism is its flexibility. When there 
is any change of service level, network service providers can adjust their service pricing promptly. If a network service 
provider has a service level agreement (SLA) with its customers, the network service providers can adjust the price without 
notifying customers. Therefore, this pricing mechanism is dynamic and usage based that could control the network 
congestion promptly. 
CONCLUSION 
In this research we proposed a simple but robust pricing scheme for the QoS mechanism over the current Internet 
architecture. Since the Internet is very unpredictable in its performance and service quality, the designing of proper pricing 
schemes can be complex and challenging. We adapted the quality index into the pricing formula directly instead of using a 
complex mathematical formula. Therefore, our model is simple and dynamic in nature. When there are any changes in the 
quality of Internet service, our pricing model can reflect the fluctuation of the service quality. 
Our model provides dynamic pricing with a price-quality schema. Therefore, it can provide a better solution for the current 
QoS pricing scenarios. We simulated the model communication network with OPNET program that is the widely used 
simulation program for network performance simulation. The results show the possible changes in service pricing and the 
associated total revenue changes. 
Future research may address multiple routes from the source applications since such a scenario is a more realistic situation 
and practical environment. When there is significant complexity of a network routing problem, the service performance will 
be changed and therefore, the pricing could be also affected. 
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